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1. Introducti on
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are in-
creasingly appealing. These programs have shown e®ectiveness in
many of their objectives when subjected to rigorous process and im-
pact evaluations: the literature is rich on CCT evaluations with signi¯-
cant impacts upon schooling, health, infant mortality, child labor, and
1 poverty reduction for bene¯ciaries. Like other programs, CCTsh a v e
come to generate expectations in areas upon which they were not ex-
plicitly intended to have impacts. One ofthese is the chronically high
income inequality in Latin America and its negative consequences re-
2 garding economic performance.
Our objective in this paper is to use a simple decomposition
methodology to shed some light on the possibility for CCTst os i g n i ¯ -
cantly reduce inequality in three Latin American countries. We hope
the results will also illuminate policy analysis in other countries of
the region.
2. H ow Each C ondi ti onalC ash Transf er P rogram W orks
2.1. Brazi l : the Bol sa Fam¶ ³lia
3 Before October 2003, Brazil had four federal CCT programs in place.
Each of these programs had its own ¯nancing scheme, implementing
4 agency, conditionalities, and information system. As their control
1 M ost evaluations w ere based on the Progresa/O portuni dades program i n
M exi co; see f or i nstance H oddi nott and Skou¯as (2004), Skou¯as and Parker
( 2 0 0 1 )a nd f o ra n o v e r v i e w t hema i n i mpa c t so fCCTsa nd adi s c us s i o n o ft he i r
lim its in L a tin A m erica , see H a n d a a n d D a v is (2 0 0 6 ).
2 See Furtado (1966),A cem ogl u,Johnson and R obi nson (2001),A ghi on,C ar-
ol iand G arc¶ ³a -P e ~ nal osa (1999),A tki nson (1997),Szekel y and H i l gert(2001),and
Fragoso and Fl orenti no (2001) f or di ®erent vi ew s on i nequal i ty, as w el l as i ts
relationship w ith grow th.
3 TheProgram a de Erradi ca» c~ ao do Trabal ho Inf anti l( PETI ) ,r unbyt heSoc i al
A ssi stanceSecretari atofthef ederalgovernm ent,w ascreated i n 1996;B ol sa Escol a
F ed era l, ru n b y th e M in istry o f E d u ca tio n , a n d th e B o lsa A lim en ta » c~ ao, run by
the M inistry of H ealth, w ere created in 2001; and the Ca r t ~ ao A l i m enta» c~ ao,r un
by the M inistry of Social D evelopm ent, w as created in early 2003.
4 ¶ A lthough the uni¯ed inform ation system , the C adastro U ni co,wasc r e at e d
i n 2001,i t w as not operati onalbef ore the end of2003.CONDI TI ONAL CAS H TRANS FERSI N BRAZI L,CHI LE AND MEXI CO 209
systems did not exchange information, a family could receive all four
and another family, equally needy, could receive none. The values of
the transfers were not harmonized so that the federal government was
engaged in transferring to similar individuals di®erent values under
similar arguments.
In October of 2003, the Bol s a Fam¶ ³lia program was created to
5 organize and merge the various federal CCTs, bene¯ting from the uni-
¯ed information system that was implemented in 2001, the C adastro
¶ Uni c o . Families in extreme poverty (monthly percapi ta income below
R $50 ($42 PPP)) that are bene¯ciaries of Bol s aFam¶ ³lia receive R $50
($42 PPP)/month each, regardless of their composition. Families in
both extreme and moderate poverty receive an additional bene¯t of
R $15 ($13 PPP)/month for every child or pregnant woman in family,
but this is limited to three children or pregnant women, therefore
R $95 ($91 PPP) is the highest amount transferred by Bol s a Fam¶ ³lia
to a family in extreme poverty and R $45 ($39 PPP)t h eh i g h e s tv a l u e
transferred to a moderately poor family. The program requires a
school attendance of 85% for school age children, updated immuniza-
tion cards for children less than seven years old, and regular visits to
health centers for breast-feeding or pregnant women.
Whenthe BrazilianNational Household Survey(PNAD), ourdata
source, was ¯elded in September 2004, the merging of all previous
CCTsi n t oBol s aFam¶ ³lia was still underway and most families, while
already registered in a single information system, were still receiv-
ing previously existing programs with di®erent conditionalities and
values. For our estimation purposes, we consider that any family re-
ceiving a federal conditional cash transfer, regardless of the program,
was receiving Bol s aFam¶ ³lia , since this is what happened shortly after.
Brazil is a decentralized federation and, while the de¯nition of
po l i c yi nth ec a s eo fCCTs pertains to the Federal Government, two im-
portant implementation aspects are left to municipalities and states.
The ¯rst is the veri¯cation of conditionalities. The Federal Govern-
ment in Brazil does not run primary schools or primary health care
centers, so it is up to the municipalities and states, particularly the
former, to verify compliance. Overall, they yield a loose control over
conditionalities, although qualitative studies show that families over-
whelmingly do comply.
5 Bo l s a Fa m¶ ³lia al so i ncorporated the Aux ¶ ³lio G ¶ as, a targeted unconditional
cash transfer program designed to subsidize cooking gas. T he P E T I has b een
sem i -i ncorporated i n thati tnow sharesthe sam e i nf orm ati on system and val ue of
th e stip en d b u t, in lo ca lities h ig h ly p ro n e to ch ild la b o r, m u n icip a l sch o o l sy stem s
still receiv e a id to m a in ta in th e Jornada A m pl i ada.¶ 210 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
The second crucial task is the primary identi¯cation of poten-
tial bene¯ciaries and provision of information about them. Although
information must be recorded on a single Federal information form,
it is up to municipal social workers to select potential bene¯ciaries
and ¯ll in all the information. In 2004 there were more candidates
than available bene¯ts, although this situation has improved with
the expansion of the program. Since bene¯ciaries are selected solely
upon income and social workers know this, they also decide, in prac-
tice, who ultimately gets selected. The results we will present suggest
that social workers have been using wisely their discretion margin in
the selection process.
2.2. C h ile: C hile S o lid a rio
C h ile S o lid ario was created in May 2002. It is a social protection
system targeted at people living in extreme poverty. The goal is to
assist the 225,000 families living in extreme poverty (about 1.5% of
the total population of 16 million people).
Families are invited to take part in this program on the basis
of their score, according to a standardized form, which generates a
multidimensional index to rank them. The higher the score the worse
is the situation of the families regarding unmet basic needs that are
grouped into 4 major categories: housing conditions, education, labor
market insertion and income. Family support is delivered for two
years, during which time families are visited by a social worker {or a
similar professional{ in order to set up with them a plan to tackle the
major problems faced by them in several areas, ranging from domestic
violence to access to public services, identi¯cation (id cards), health
notions, and employment.
Besides the family support, bene¯ciaries also are entitled to A-
porte Sol i dari o or Bono de Protecci ¶ o nal aF a mi l i a , a conditional cash
t r a n s f e rt h a tl a s t sa sl o n ga st h ef a m i l ys u p p o r td o e sa n di sp a i dt o
females heading families or to the female partner of the head. In
order to receive the Bono de Protecci ¶ on, families have to comply with
the conditionalities embedded in some actions that they must take
in order to achieve the agreed targets of the plan. The aim of the
Bono de Protecci ¶ on is to help the family to pay for a basket of goods,
amenities and services that was considered as the minimum below
which a family could not be considered as socially included. After
24 months, the family will continue to receive a ¯nancial support {
¶ the S u bsidio U n ico F a m ilia r{ and will have priority in the access toCONDI TI ONAL CAS H TRANS FERSI N BRAZI L,CHI LE AND MEXI CO 211
social protection programs or initiatives for another three years to
help them out of poverty. If the family meets the target before two
years, it is automatically excluded from the program by the social
worker responsible for the family.
A distinct feature of the Chilean Bono de Protecci ¶ on is that its
value decreases over the two-year period. In 2003, the values ranged
from $10,500 pesos ($33 PPP) per month during the ¯rst six months in
¶ the program down to the value ofthe S u bsid io U n ico F a m ilia r during
the last six months, $3,716 ($12 PPP).
2.3. M exi co: O portuni dades
Internationally, O portuni dades is the best known CCT program. The
program, originally named Pr o g r e s a, began in 1997 and initially cov-
ered 0.3 million households, expanding to 2.5 million families by 2000.
In its initial years, the focus was on poor rural municipalities with less
than 2500 inhabitants that had the minimum necessary school and
health facilities for the conditionalities to be applied. In 2001, the
name of the program was changed to O portuni dades and its coverage
was expanded to include small urban locations with 2 500 to 14 999
inhabitants in 2001, and all urban areas one year later. This resulted
in ¯ve million bene¯ciary households by 2004.
Selection of bene¯ciaries follows a three-stage procedure. First,
municipalities are chosen according to a multidimensional index of
marginality that classi¯es them into ¯ve categories. Secondly, house-
holds within chosen municipalities are selected according to a socio-
demographic study based on discriminant analysis. In municipalities
with very high indexes of marginality about 90% of the households
are selected, and this percentage decreases to about 6% in those that
a r ec l a s s i ¯ e di nt h ev e r yl o wr a n g e .T h et h i r da n d¯ n a ls t e pi n v o l v e s
feedback from the communities, in order to check eligibility.
The transfer has three basic components, two ofwhich are condi-
tional and one is non-conditional. Households bene¯ting from Op o r t u -
ni dadesreceive an unconditional transfer in the amount of$250 pesos
($32 PPP) per older adult in the household. Additionally, households
receive a food support transfer of $189 pesos ($24 PPP) conditioned
on attending training sessions on nutrition and health. The more
substantive transfer, though, is the scholarship given to children and
young adults in grades 3 to 12. Scholarships are conditional on school
attendance and health check-ups; schools certify the ¯rst while health
clinics attest to the compliance with health check-ups.¶ 212 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
The value of the scholarship increases with the grade and is gen-
erally higher for females. Starting with an amount of $120 pesos ($15
PPP) for children in primary education, it goes up to $760 pesos ($98
PPP) for females in grade 12. On the whole, a household can receive
a maximum of $1,095 pesos ($141 PPP) in scholarships if the house-
hold receives only scholarships for students in primary and secondary
education, but the ceiling is $1,855 pesos ($239 PPP) if the household
includes students in medium-high education. Transfers for the elderly
s t a r t e do n l yi n2 0 0 5a n da r er e c e i v e dd i r e c t l yb yt h e m .
2.4. D i®erences in the Sel ection P rocess
This brief comparison between C hi l e Sol i dari o, O portuni dades and
Bol s aFam¶ ³lia shows that the targeting mechanisms are totally di®er-
ent between them. While all have some kind of centralized database
and a standardized data collection form, the similarities stop there.
In Brazil, municipal civil servants are those charged with identifying
the poor and ¯lling in the forms, and the only targeting criterion is
income. In Mexico, identi¯cation is done by a central o±ce and Fed-
eral civil servants (allowed little leeway in the selection process) using
a multidimensional index for targeting. In Chile the social worker in
charge of the family has at his disposal a multidimensional index but
is also allowed considerable leeway in selecting families.
3.D ata and M ethods
3.1. I n c o meDa t a
To investigate the impacts of CCTs upon income inequality in Brazil,
Chile and Mexico we will decompose the Gini coe±cient ofthe family
percapi ta income distribution by the components oftotal income. For
this, all that is needed is the average per capita household income by
percentiles, as well as the averages of each component (in family per
capi ta terms). This information should be available for two points in
time, before and after the implementation of CCT programs. Finally
{and crucially{ the information should be as standardized as possible
across time and countries.
These desired characteristics of the data impose upon us the use
of income instead of consumption, because information on expendi-
tures, although available, can not be found from the same sources thatCONDI TI ONAL CAS H TRANS FERSI N BRAZI L,CHI LE AND MEXI CO 213
yield data on CCTs, except for Mexico. Comparability across time was
not an issue because we used di®erent rounds of the same household
surveys to gather income data, and these have not gone through sig-
ni¯cant changes during the period. For all countries, the year before
the CCT programs were implemented was in the mid nineties, 1995
or 1996; and the point after was the closest available, 2003 or 2004.
We tried to construct income variables that were as close as pos-
sible for all countries. The ¯rst step was the construction of total
household income. This was done by adding up all the individual
incomes, regardless of the source, within households. We computed
neither the income of domestic servants nor that of second line rel-
atives, nor the income of boarders or lodgers, in household income.
Total household income was then divided by household size (net of
the residents whose income was not included), the quotient being the
per capi ta household income.
Limited by comparability issues, we decomposed total household
income into four categories: i) la bo r in co m e; ii) socialsecurity incom e;
iii) CCT in co m e; iv) other i ncom e. Labor income is all income from
labor, and includes the estimated monetary value of non-monetary
income from labor (in-kind payments). Social security income is all
transfers that can be classi¯ed as such, mainly pensions, but it also
includes some other cash transfers such as social assistance transfers,
unemployment insurance, etc. CCT income is the component under
scrutiny, and it is the income received by the families registered in the
programs and this component only exists in the second time point.
Other income is any other income gathered by the survey. This last
income component is mainly comprised of income from capital and
private transfers. Means-tested, unconditional cash transfers are also
included in other income.
This four-fold categorization of income was applied to the orig-
inal income information collected by the household surveys in order
to obtain the income components described above. Then the four
components were separately added within households, and divided
by the household size in the same way as total income. We ended
up with four per capita income components summing up per capi ta
household income. Finally, income from the ¯rst period was adjusted
to be comparable to the last period using the general consumer price
index of each country and period.
We had to overcome three di±culties when aggregating the orig-
inal income components into four categories. The ¯rst was related to
t h ed e g r e ea n dt y p eo fd e t a i li nt h ei n c o m ec o l l e c t i o n .I nM e x i c oa n d
Chile, for instance, the CCT income was already split from others into¶ 214 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
its own variable, or °agged in such a way that allowed its computa-
tion easily. In the case of Brazil, CCT income was mixed with other
income, and we had to use the methodology developed by Soares et
al . (2006) to separate it.
The second challenge was related to some adjustments that the
disseminating institutions ofeach country do to the income data gath-
ered in the ¯eld. In the Brazilian survey, we have access to the in-
formation as it was collected, and the people whose income was not
reported are °agged with a special code. We simply dropped out
all the members of the households where at least one member had
non-declared income from at least one source, losing around 2% of
t h es a m p l e . I nt h ec a s eo fC h i l ea n dM e x i c o ,u n k n o w ni n c o m ew a s
imputed at the source, and there is no way to distinguish people with
imputed income from the others.
Chile also applies other adjustments to income variables with the
purpose of making the aggregate ¯gures yielded by the survey match
with those from national accounts. The adjustment factor varies ac-
cordingly to income type, and for labor income also varies with the
type of recipient (wage-earning employee, self-employed, etc.). The
information available on Chilean datasets makes it very di±cult to
reverse this adjustment, which is not reproducible for the other coun-
tries.
The third challenge was related to the construction of total in-
come, namely, what should be included, and what should be left out.
In Chile and Mexico, it is usual to impute the value of the estimated
rental value of the self-owned housing unit as household income. In
the case of Mexico, other expenditures related to the housing unit
might also be imputed. We did not impute any of those incomes,
decided to work only with declared incomes, and only retained im-
puted incomes due to non-declaration already in the data, as it was
impossible to identify in which cases income had been imputed.
While we managed to construct a reasonably comparable total
income ¯gure across countries, we had to accept that our estimates of
inequality are not always the same as o±cial, consensual, or widely
recognized country estimates. In the case of Mexico, the di®erence
between o±cial ¯gures and the ones we present is the greatest. This
happens for two main reasons. First, as already mentioned, unlike
o±cial estimates we did not impute any values related to the housing
unit. Second, and more important, we computed neither the esti-
mated monetary value of in-kind donations, nor that of household's
production for own-consumption. As the poorest fractions of the
populations are the ones that receive donations and that produce forCONDI TI ONAL CAS H TRANS FERSI N BRAZI L,CHI LE AND MEXI CO 215
their own-consumption, not imputing them raises the level ofinequal-
ity. But although we did not compute in-kind items that were not
received as payment for labor, we followed closely the treatment given
to income variables by the Mexican Technical Committee on Poverty
Measurement. And as a consequence, monetary incomes were calcu-
lated as the price-adjusted average of the six-month period for which
incomes were observed.
All the surveys we used had complete or almost complete na-
tional coverage, and correspond to the main sources often used to
address inequality in each of the countries. Brazilian data comes
from the 1995 and 2004 rounds of the P esquisa nacionalpor am ostra
de dom i c¶ ³lio s (PNAD); Chilean data comes from the 1996 and 2003
rounds of the E ncuesta de caracterizaci¶ on soci oecon¶ om ica naci onal
(Casen); and Mexican data comes from the 1996 and 2004 rounds of
the Encuesta naci onalde i ngresos y gastos de l os hogares (ENI GH).
3.2. D ecom position of the G ini C oe± cient
Kakwani (1980) and Shorrocks (1982) show that the Gini coe±cient
can be easily decomposed according to factor components and the
resulting expression depends only upon the concentration coe±cient
ofeach component and its weight in total income. Equation (1) shows
this expression:
X
G = c' (1) kk
k
where G is the Gini index, c represents the coe±cient of concen- k
tration of factor component k relative to total income and ' is the k
weight of factor k in total income. Di®erencing (1) we have:
X
¢G =( ¹ c ¢' +¹ ' ¢c )( 2 ) kk k k
k
The bars over a variable refer to the average of a given variable
over the two periods and the capital deltas (¢) refer to the di®erence
from one period to the next. The ¯rst term in the summation repre-
sents the composition e®ect and the second the change in coe±cients
of concentration. If we keep in mind that the sum of changes in the
weights of all factor components is zero, we can subtract it from the
formula above:¶ 216 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
XX
¢G =( ¹ c ¢' +¹ ' ¢c ) ¡ G ¢' (3) kk k k k
kk
Rearranging, we have the following expression:
X
¢G =( ( ¹ c ¡ G )¢' +¹ ' ¢c )( 4 ) kk k k
k
The advantage of expression (4) is that it shows clearly that
income components less concentrated than the Gini coe±cient are
inequality reducing while those more concentrated than the Gini are P 6 inequality increasing. This is why we subtracted the term G ¢' k
k
from the original expression. This result is intuitive because it states
that if an income component becomes less concentrated, or if a neg-
atively concentrated component is added to a given income distribu-
tion, inequality will fall and if the opposite happens, inequality will
rise. This is useful because it allows us to identify the contribution
of any income source to a change in inequality.
A criticism that has been leveled at this decomposition by factor
components is that it does not have a counterfactual interpretation.
In other words, G ¡ c' does not necessarily represent what the Gini kk
coe±cient would be if income source k vanished because the order of
individuals in the distribution might change. Our answer is that the
policy question we intend to address is incremental {which programs
should receive more funds and not whether a given program should
exist{ and the interpretation ofthe Shorrocks decomposition by factor
c o m p o n e n t sa n s w e r st h i sq u e s t i o na si tp r o v i d e st h ei m p a c to ft h e
marginal currency unit of a given income source upon inequality, as
opposed to the impact average currency unit, which is provided by,
for example, counterfactual microsimulations.
4. R esul ts
We begin by comparing the family per capita income distributions of
e a c hc o u n t r yi nt w om o m e n t si nt i m e ,o n ei nt h em i d - 19 9 0 s ,be f o r et h e
conditional cash transfer programs were put in place and the other
in the mid-2000s, when these programs were already well established
6 W hi l e nei ther K akw ani(1980) nor Shorrocks (1982) deri ve expressi on (4),
Lerm an and Y i tzhaki(1985)do so,al though they do notem phasi zei tsi m portanceCONDI TI ONAL CAS H TRANS FERSI N BRAZI L,CHI LE AND MEXI CO 217
in the three countries of our study. Inequality was and still is very
high in all three countries. Table 1 shows changes of-0.028 and -0.027
points in the Gini coe±cient of Brazil and Mexico, which account for
a reduction in overall inequality of5% in both countries while in Chile
7 the Gini coe±cient was approximately constant.
Table 1 also shows the concentration coe±cients for each type
of income (labor, social security, other income and CCT income) and
t h ew e i g h to fe a c hi n c o m es o u r c ei nt o t a li n c o m e .B ym u l t i p l y i n gt h e
concentration index of an income source by its weight we have the
total contribution of the source to the overall inequality as measured
by the Gini index (equation 1). Dividing this result by the Gini gives
the percentage contribution of the source to total inequality.
Labor is the main source of income in the three countries of our
study. Its share in total income varies from 72.6% (Brazil, 2004) to
89.1% (Mexico, 1996). However, its importance has been declining
over time. The patterns ofthis decline di®er from country to country.
In Brazil and Mexico it was mainly associated with an increase in the
share of social security incomes and in Chile, the country that had
the most modest change in the weight of labor, it resulted from a
combination of a slightly larger share of social security and other
incomes.
Government direct transfers {here represented by CCTsa n dS o -
cial Security{ are the second most important source ofincome in these
countries and their share has been increasing in all countries over the
years. When these transfers are disaggregated it becomes clear that
the weight of social security transfers is much higher than the weight
of the conditional cash transfer programs. The latter never reach 1%
of total income. In Brazil, social security {both of a contributory and
a non-contributory nature{ came to represent almost one quarter of
total income. In Chile and Mexico social security accounts for 7.9%
and 5.0%, respectively, of total income. It should be noted that the
\other income" also includes non-conditional cash transfers.
The concentration indexes presented in table 1 give an idea of
how each type of income is distributed in the population. Given its
weight in the total, labor income indexes basically reproduce the Gini
coe±cients in each country. And, despite some common beliefs to the
contrary, only in Chile are the social security transfers inequality-
reducing in both time points; the high concentration of social se-
curity transfers contribute to increased levels of inequality in Brazil
7 W h ile w e d o n o t rep o rt th is h ere, ch a n g es in in eq u a lity in B ra zil a n d M ex ico
are hi ghl y si gni ¯cant. See A zevedo (2007) f or B razi l .¶ 218 ES TUDI OSECONOMI COS
and Mexico. Conversely, income from CCTs is the least concentrated
income source in all three countries.
4.1. D eco m po sitio n o f C h an ges in In equ a lity
Table 2 presents the factor decomposition (4) ofchanges in inequality
from the mid nineties up to 2003/4 for each country. The decompo-
sition points out the contribution of the changes in the share (com-
position e®ect) and in the concentration of each source of income to
the total change in the Gini index. The relative contribution of each
factor to the total change in inequality is obtained by dividing the
absolute contribution of that factor to the change in the Gini index
by this overall change in the Gini index.
Labor income is the main driving force of the level of inequality
in the three countries. This is understandable, since labor income
accounts for a large share of the total income of the families. More
speci¯cally, changes in the concentration of labor income were the
most important driving force for changes in inequality in these coun-
tries. Although we can observe changes in the weight oflabor income,
their contribution to the reduction of inequality in Brazil and Mexico
was small. In Chile the percentage of total change associated with
the fall of the share of labor income in total income is 19%; however,
it must be taken into account that there was almost no variation of
inequality in Chile and therefore 19% corresponds to only 0.0002 Gini
points.
Income from social security also made an important contribution
to the dynamics of inequality, raising inequality in all countries but
Chile. In Mexico (and in Brazil) one observed a higher concentration
as well as a larger share of this income from social security. Such a
combination, ceteris paribus, would have induced an increase in in-
equality, which corresponded in Mexico to one sixth (one quarter in
Brazil) of the reduction in inequality brought about by a better dis-
tribution of labor incomes. In Chile, however, social security incomes
became less concentrated and more important in total income, coun-
teracting the trends observed in the labor market. The contribution
of social security income to the reduction in inequality in Chile com-
pensated more than half of the inequality increasing contribution of
labor incomes.
The content of the variable `other income', as already said, de-
p e n d so nt h ec o u n t r y . I nB r a z i l ,t h er e d u c t i o ni nt h ec o n c e n t r a t i o n
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of the Be ne f ¶ ³cio d e P resta » c~ ao C onti nuada, a large non-conditional
means tested transfer to the elderly and to people with disabilities
that render them unable to work. Although this income source also
includes rent, interest, dividends and private transfers, these were not
relevant to changes in income distribution over the period (Soares et
al . 2006). In Mexico, other income includes non-conditional targeted
cash transfers such as ProC am po, public and private scholarships, do-
nations from NGOs, income from capital, and national or international
remittances. In Chile, \other income" includes, once again, impor-
tant non-conditional cash transfers (PASI S and SU F), as well as capital
and other income. Our evidence suggests that means-tested uncon-
ditional cash transfers were also important in reducing inequality in
Brazil and Chile, which would help to explain the inequality reducing
e®ect of the changes in this component for both countries, as shown
in table 2. But as our focus in this paper is on CCTs, we leave for
future research the impacts upon inequality of those unconditional
transfers.
8 The conditional cash transfers proved to be an important in-
equality-reducing factor in all three countries {in Mexico and Brazil
they were surpassed only by labor income. But their contribution to
the fall in inequality was disproportionately high given their small
share in total income. With a share less than 1% of the total income
in all three countries, the CCTs were responsible for 15% of inequality
reduction in Chile and 21% in Brazil and Mexico. Just to give an
idea of the relative impact on inequality of the CCTs ,i nb o t hM e x i c o
and Brazil they were more than enough to counteract the increase in
the concentration in social security incomes, although their share in
total income amounts to a fraction of the latter.
In Chile, cash transfer income is very well targeted but it amounts
to such a small share of the total income that its contribution to the
fall in inequality is very modest. Indeed, among all factors contribut-
ing to reduce inequality in Chile, cash transfers were the least im-
portant; the e®ect of social security incomes, for instance, was more
than 30 times higher than the contribution of the CCTs. Therefore,
as targeting is similar, if the CCT share of total income were larger
we would expect an impact as high as that observed for Brazil and
Mexico.
8 T he joint com position and concentration e®ects are represented for C C T s
only in table 2, b ecause this com p onent did not exist in the ¯rst tim e p oint (so
b oth its share and concentration w ere null).Tabl e 1
G iniC oe± cients and their D ecom positions by C oncentration
C oe± ci ents,and W ei ghts i n TotalIncom e ofEach Incom e Source
P
G = c' In co m e B ra zil C h ile M exico kk
k
Source - k 1995 2004 1996 2003 1996 2004
G -G i n i Total . 5985 . 5711 . 5630 . 5620 . 5374 . 5103
c Labor .5943 .5633 .5692 .5815 .5420 .5080 k
Social Security .5858 .6118 .4778 .4201 .5646 .6320
Other .7422 .6206 .5715 .5186 .4764 .5264
CCT -.5271 -.5383 -.4855
' Labor .8204 .7260 .8319 .8164 .8906 .8600 k
Weight in total income Social Security .1425 .2270 .0701 .0794 .0298 .0501
Other .0371 .0419 .0980 .1041 .0795 .0844
CCT .0000 .0051 .0000 .0001 .0000 .0055
c' Labor .4875 .4090 .4735 .4747 .4827 .4369 kk
Contribution to Total Social Security .0835 .1389 .0335 .0333 .0168 .0317
Inequality Other .0275 .0260 .0560 .0540 .0379 .0444
CCT -.0027 -.0001 -.0027
Source: PN A D 1995,2004;C asen 1996,2003;EN IG H 1996,2004. N ote: val ues rounded. In the i ni ti alyear there
wa sno CCT i nc o me .Tabl e 2
C hanges in G ini C oe± cients and their D ecom positions by C hanges in C oncentration,
C oe± ci ents,and W ei ghts i n TotalIncom e ofEach Incom e Source
P
¢ G =( ( ¹ c ¡ G )¢ ' +¹ ' ¢ c ) In co m e B ra zil C h ile M exico kk k k
k
Sour c e-k Val ue % Val ue % Val ue %
¢G -C h a n g ei nG i n i Total -. 0274 100 -. 0011 100 -. 0272 100
¹ ' ¢c Labor -.0239 87.3 .0101 -941.2 -.0297 109.5 kk
Concentration E®ect Social Security .0048 -17.5 -.0043 401.7 .0027 -9.9
Other -.0021 7.5 -.0048 450.2 .0018 -6.7
(¹ c ¡ G )¢' Labor .0006 -2.1 -.0002 18.6 .0000 .1 kk
Composition E®ect Social Security .0012 -4.3 -.0011 98.1 .0015 -5.6
Other -.0023 8.3 -.0006 57.9 .0022 -7.9
(¹ c ¡ G )¢' +¹ ' ¢c Labor -.0234 85.2 .0099 -922.7 -.0298 109.6 kk k k
Concentration and Social Security .0060 -21.8 -.0054 499.8 .0042 -15.5
Composition Other -.0043 15.8 -.0054 508.2 .0040 -14.7
CCT -.0057 20.8 -.0002 14.7 -.0056 20.5
Source: PN A D 1995,2004;C asen 1996,2003;EN IG H 1996,2004. N ote: val ues rounded.222 ESTUDIOS ECON´ OMICOS
These results allow us to derive a pattern of change in inequal-
ity in the three countries of our study. In Brazil and Mexico the
story is almost the same. Inequality is falling mainly due to the re-
duced concentration in labor incomes. This fall is also due to an
important contribution from the conditional cash transfer programs.
Conversely, the concentration of social security incomes is increasing
in both countries and preventing inequality from falling even more. In
Chile the labor market is driving inequality up but the social security
system (including the non-contributory pensions and non-conditional
targeted transfers grouped in other incomes) is compensating the neg-
ative performance of the labor market. Chile Solidario plays a minor
role in the dynamics of inequality in Chile.
5. Conclusions
Mexico, Brazil and Chile are countries marked by a high degree of
income inequality. This, however, is not a static picture. Some income
sources increased or decreased their contribution to total income, and
some had their concentration modiﬁed. The result of these changes
is that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s the level of total income
inequality was stable in Chile but fell substantially in Mexico and
Brazil.
All three countries have put in place Conditional Cash Transfer
programs. The total amount transferred by these programs is still
modest, its share in total income ranging from almost zero in the
Chilean Chile Solidario to 0.5% in the Brazilian Bolsa Fam´ ılia and
the Mexican Oportunidades by the time of the surveys. These ﬁgures
are small in comparison to the weight of transfers from the social
security system. However, CCT income is so well targeted that even
with such a small participation in total income they have an important
contribution to decreasing inequality in Mexico and Brazil. In those
two countries CCTs were the second most important determinant of
the fall in inequality between 1996 and 2004. Only in Chile, where
their weight was almost zero, did the CCTs not have any relevant
contribution to the dynamics of inequality.
The analysis herewith presented has some clear limitations. The
most obvious one is that we treat the social security system as a single
unit despite the fact that there are several diﬀerent programs within
this system. By putting together contributory and non-contributory
pensions and some social assistance programs and concluding about
the overall impact of social security, we are not being explicit aboutCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS IN BRAZIL, CHILE AND MEXICO 223
the important role of the social assistance programs on inequality.
Similarly, the content of what we call ‘other income’ is equally het-
erogeneous and does not single out the impact of diﬀerent types of
private and public transfers on inequality. Although we are convinced
that isolating such diﬀerent sources of income was not advisable for
this particular study, we believe that the same analysis done on a
country by country basis would beneﬁt from more disaggregated cat-
egories.
Our study does not lead to conclusions that allow us to prescribe
detailed recommendations for redistributive policies. Nevertheless,
there are some general implications of our results for development
strategies aiming at the reduction of inequality.
The ﬁrst is that, there are many roads to good targeting. Chile,
Mexico and Brazil have chosen quite diﬀerent approaches: decentral-
ization and income as sole criterion in Brazil, centralization and a
multidimensional index in Mexico, and social worker empowerment
and a multidimensional index in Chile. All three approaches, how-
ever, produce concentration coeﬃcients close to -0.5.
The second is that, due to their excellent targeting, CCTs are
a very low cost way of reducing inequality that can be replicated
in many other countries. Even in the countries where the CCTs are
consolidated and cover a large share of the population they can still
be ampliﬁed without representing a heavy ﬁscal burden comparable
to that of traditional social security.
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